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This paper analyzes household fertility and child occupation decisions
in a risky environment. Fertility decisions are made ￿rst, when only the
distribution of shocks is known. When shocks are realized and fertility
is ￿xed, parents adapt by allocating children￿ s occupations, i.e. school,
paid work and domestic chores. Fertility is decreasing with the shock
probability and increasing with parental permanent income. Households
facing an adverse shock make more use of child labor and send fewer chil-
dren to school, unless the total number of children is small. These pre-
dictions are tested with data from the Senegalese SEHW (2003) following
this two-step methodology. A Poisson model estimates the number of
children with classical instruments and household-level information on
shock distribution, con￿rming the theory￿ s predictions on fertility. A
multivariate Tobit model estimates the determinants of children occu-
pations, including the occurrence of shocks and accounting for the en-
dogeneity of fertility. The number of children increases (decreases) the
probability of child specialization (multiple activities). Shock-related
variables have an adverse e⁄ect on schooling.
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11 Introduction
The negative relationship between family size and schooling is one of the pillars of the
economics of the household literature. This ￿nding is often explained using an argument
of resources dilution: parents have limited time and money to devote to the education
of their children, so that those with fewer children invest more per child. The seminal
contribution in this literature is due to Becker & Lewis (1973). Their model postulates
that the shadow price of the number of children is an increasing function of child quality
and that the shadow price of child quality is an increasing function of the number of
children. This interdependence of shadow prices leads parents to ￿nd a tradeo⁄ between
the quantity and the quality of children. Numerous empirical studies con￿rm the quality-
quantity tradeo⁄ prediction. Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1980), using Indian data, show that
an exogenous increase in fertility signi￿cantly decreases the level of schooling of all children
measured as the age standardized sum of the educational attainment of all children in
the household. Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (1997) show a delaying e⁄ect in schooling
related to the number of children in Peruvian families; and this e⁄ect increases as the
number of siblings increase. Using data from Vietnam, Anh et al. (1998) ￿nd a negative
relationship between school attendance and family size, after controlling for individual
and household characteristics. In the Korean case, Lee (2008) ￿nds signi￿cant evidence
of negative impact of each additional child on the monthly household expenditure for
education.
However, contrary to Becker and Lewis theory and evidence from other regions,
early studies in sub-Saharan Africa revealed a reverse association between family size
and schooling. Gomes (1984) and Chernichovsky (1985) found that educational attain-
ment has a positive relationship with family size respectively in urban Kenya and rural
Botswana. Later studies mitigate the early ￿ndings but results remain mixed. Mont-
gomery & Kouame (1993) report negative link between family size and schooling in urban
areas of C￿te d￿ Ivoire but a positive one in rural areas; Lloyd & Blanc (1996) reveal
signi￿cant negative relationships in only two nations (Kenya and Namibia) out of seven
sub-Saharan countries.
Why is the quality-quantity tradeo⁄ not very consistent in Africa? According to
Gomes (1984), African parents can have many children and educate a high proportion of
them, as long as they can induce the advantaged children to ￿nance their other siblings.
The existence of such an intra-household coordination mechanism promotes specialization
of household members in relation to their number, abilities and opportunity costs of their
time.
This paper revisits the link between family size and children occupation in an African
setting using evidence from Senegal. The paper investigates how children are assigned
to di⁄erent activities or combination of activities in relation with adult and child market
performance and number of children in the household.
The contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, it provides a theoretical framework that links household composition, labor
market performance and children￿ s time allocation. There is little theoretical work that
directly addresses this link in an african setting despite numerous empirical studies on
occupations in Africa. Our theoretical model contains the classical ingredients of the lit-
erature, in that the household head maximizes her utility, which depends on consumption
of both tradable and domestic goods and children￿ s number and education. Furthermore,
2our model captures two original aspects of the fertility/quality puzzle that, to the best of
our knowledge, have been neglected in this literature. First, it has become a well docu-
mented fact that transitory income shocks play an important role in the determination of
child school trajectories.1 Indeed, in a context of incomplete insurance and capital mar-
kets, shocks may induce parents to adjust the children￿ s occupations according to their
needs. Second, once shocks are realized, parents cannot adjust fertility instantaneously.
This point must make shocks an important determinant of fertility decisions. Therefore,
the timing of our model is the following. Fertility decisions are made ￿rst, in a risky en-
vironment, while children￿ s occupations - namely school, paid work and domestic chores
￿are assigned in a second period, when shocks are realized.2
The model￿ s main predictions are the following. Fertility is higher in households
with more favorable ex-ante distribution of parental income. More precisely, fertility is
decreasing in the probability of facing an adverse shock and in the magnitude of such a
potential shock. Conversely, fertility increases with parental permanent income. Ex post,
the number of working children is smaller among households with high parental labor
productivity, high child domestic productivity and low supervision costs. The number of
domestic children is positively a⁄ected by fertility, while the opposite stands for parental
supply of domestic labor. The number of school children is likely to increase with fertility
if parental labor income is large and/or the cost of raising children is low. The impact of
fertility on schooling will also be larger if preferences for education are strong. Children
occupations are a⁄ected by shocks in the following way. Households which face an adverse
shock make more use of child labor than they would have if the shock had not occured.
The impact of the shock on other decision variables depends on the total number of
children.
The second contribution concerns the empirical analysis. We test the model￿ s predic-
tions in two steps.
First, a Poisson model estimates the number of children with information on the house-
hold￿ s ex ante distribution of income and standard instruments. This approach allows us
to treat the demographic composition of the household as endogenously determined. Fol-
lowing our theory, the number of children in the household results of household life-cycle
decision concerning fertility. We control for the number of children using as instruments
shocks that have a⁄ected households during the last decade and the age of the house-
hold head at his ￿rst child. While these instruments may have an impact on children￿ s
occupations, credible alternative instruments are unfortunately not available from the
dataset.
Second, a multivariate Tobit model estimates the determinants of children occupa-
1Bj￿rkman (2006) ￿nds that income shocks have large negative and highly signi￿cant e⁄ects on female
enrollment in primary schools and the e⁄ect grows stronger for older girls in Uganda. Using panel
data from Tanzania, Dehejia et al. (2003) ￿nd that households respond to transitory income shocks by
increasing child labor, but that the extent to which child labor is used as a bu⁄er is lower when households
have access to credit. Using panel data from Madagascar, Gubert & Robilliard (2007) ￿nd that transitory
income shocks have a signi￿cant impact on the probability of leaving school. Jacoby & Skou￿as (1997)
study responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic, as well as to anticipated and unanticipated, income shocks
in India. They ￿nd that seasonal ￿ uctuations in school attendance are a form of self-insurance but one
which does not result in a substantial loss of human capital on average.
2We distinguish market work from domestic chores instead of looking only at the trade-o⁄ between
child labor and schooling since grouping work occupations (paid and domestic labor) can lead to false
results because, as our model shows, the determinants of these two occupations di⁄er. Also, parental
time is to be allocated between paid work and domestic good production in the model.
3tions bringing in the occurrence of shocks. This estimation accounts for the endogeneity
of fertility by introducing the residuals of the ￿rst estimation following Smith & Blundell
(1986) two-steps procedure. In the multivariate Tobit model, the dependent variables
are the numbers of children within a household involved in each occupation (home pro-
duction, market work, or schooling) or without one. This approach is innovative since
most studies, except Orbeta (2005), consider individual occupational status to estimate
the determinants of household decisions of children￿ s occupation.1 Individual outcomes
implicitly assume the independence of the decision for each child within the same house-
hold, whereas coordination within the household invalidates this assumption. It is obvious
that the number of children present in the household as well as the occupation of each
child in￿ uence parents￿decisions on the activities of the other siblings. Using the number
of children in di⁄erent activities allows having dependent variables closer to reality and
taking account the issue of correlations among children within the same household and
overcoming the problem of independence of the decision for each child.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 The model
The household head makes her decision about fertility in a risky environment, when the
distribution of outcomes is known but not its realization. The allocation of children￿ s
activities - namely school, paid work and domestic chores ￿takes place later, when shocks
are realized. This setting captures the idea that depending on the shocks they face,
parents cannot adjust fertility instantaneously but can allocate the time of their children
accordingly. Formally, parent labor productivity wp can be high with probability p (wp =
w), or low with probability 1￿p. In this case, a negative shock ￿ occurs and wp = w￿￿.3
The timing is the following: 1) The household head decides on her number of children
N. 2) Nature determines whether a negative shock has taken place (i.e. parental labor
productivity wp is realized). 3) The household head allocates the occupations of each of
her N children and her own time.
The household head maximizes her utility, which depends on consumption of both
tradable and domestic goods and children￿ s education. The head is endowed with one
unit of productive time. A share (1￿d) of this time is to be allocated to paid work, which
has a productivity per unit of time of wp, and a share d to domestic good production.
The household head￿ s productivity per unit of domestic labor is normalized to 1. Raising
a child irrespective of his/her activity costs ￿. Let us now turn to child activities. Our
data shows that children are mostly assigned to a single activity.4 This may be justi￿ed
by the existence of scale economies, which should particularly be the case in schooling,
where partial attendance is very unlikely to provide signi￿cant results. Similarly, learning
by doing may lead working children to specialize in this occupation. This observation
leads us to depart from the standard interpretation of models of fertility and child qual-
1However, Orbeta (2005) focuses only on children attending school and does not take into account
other activities.
3One could equivalently write w as wh and w ￿ ￿ as wl, but the notation we use allows a more
interesting comparative statics exercise, in which one can study the e⁄ect of the base wage w, and that
of shocks ￿ separately.
4Less than 15% of the sample are engaged in multiple activities.
4ity/occupation where children are treated homogeneously and where the household head￿ s
decision variables are the shares of time allocated to an average representative child. In-
stead, we interpret occupations in our model as the number of children allocated to each
activity, with the constraint that the sum of children of each type equals total fertility
decided in the ￿rst period:
nl + nd + ne = N;
where nl, nd and ne are respectively the numbers of working, domestic and school children.
Working children earn a wage rate of wc ￿ wp. However, supervision costs are required
for child labor. These costs are captured by parameters sl and are convex in the number
of children.5 The household head￿ s tradable good consumption equals
C = (1 ￿ d)wp + nlwc ￿ sln
2
l ￿ N￿: (1)
Domestic children allocate their whole unit of time to produce ￿ ￿ 1 units of the domestic
good.6 The household head￿ s domestic good consumption equals
D = d + ￿nd: (2)
Finally, despite the potential need to make their children work, parents are altrusistic
towards their children. They care about child quality, i.e. education, since the latter
determines children￿ s future income and welfare. As in previous models of endogeneous
fertility, the utility derived from child quality is equal to the product between the number
of children and their quality, with the particular feature here that children may be reach
di⁄erent qualities according to their occupation:
E = neQ + (nd + nl)q (3)
= NQ ￿ (nd + nl)(Q ￿ q);
where Q and q represent the quality attached to respectively educated and uneducated
children. There are two interpretations to the functionnal form of E. The ￿rst one is
in line with the concept of a child compensation mechanism of Gomes (1984): if such a
mechanism exists, then parents should only care about the total human capital generated,
the returns to which are redistributed among children. Even in the absence of such
a mechanism, our formulation remains valid if one considers parents as utilitarist with
respect to their children￿ s education.
The household head￿ s preferences are assumed separable in each of these three goods.
For simplicity and empirical testability, preferences are assumed Cobb-Douglas, so that
the household head￿ s utility is
H = ￿ ln(C) + ￿ ln(D) + ￿ln(E);
Given these preferences, we further assume without loss of generality that ￿ + ￿ + ￿ = 1.
Let us now turn to the resolution of the model.
We proceed by backward induction, and start at stage 3, where both fertility and the
state of the world are realized and the household head must assign the number of children
5A broader interpretation of decreasing returns to child labor may be used as well.
6We assume that domestic work can be directly observed and does not involve any supervision costs,
which is well admitted in the literature.
5to each occupation and allocate her own time. For N and wp given, the head￿ s objective
at this stage is to maximize H with respect to d, nd and nl, subject to (1) to (3). First











N￿ ￿ (nd + nl)
(FOC nd)








Q￿q. Let us brie￿ y comment on ￿. If q > 0, that is, despite the fact that some
children may be uneducated, those are still considered as "goods" by their parents, then
￿ > 1. If on the contrary q ￿ 0, that is, parents su⁄er so much from having uneducated
children that those may be interpreted as "bads" (the presence of such children decreases
E), then ￿ 2 [0;1].
















The existence of working children requires child wage wc to be larger than the threshold




@nl ), the threshold ￿wp is nothing but the the n￿
l-




l . An alternative interpretation of the
condition for the existence of child labor is that child labor productivity (relative to child
domestic productivity) wc
￿ is larger than adult relative productivity
wp
1 . Two cases can
be distiguished here. First, when adult labor productivity is low, the number of working
children will be strictly positive. However, when adult labor productivity is high, it may
be that wc￿￿wp < 0, in which case there might be no child labor at the optimum: n￿
l = 0.
We focus here on the case where child labor is interior in both states of the world. The





2sl ￿ 0, we are left with a two-equation, two-unknown system, which


























































Consumption of each good depends on its respective coe¢ cient and on relative prices, and
on total household normalized income Y . At the optimum, the "returns" to each type
of child are equalized at ￿￿wp ￿ ￿. While education and domestic chores have constant
returns, child labor returns are decreasing due to supervision costs, so that the latter
provides a surplus of
(wc￿￿wp)2
4sl .7 In order to make relevant the distinction between the
two states of the world (absence and occurance of an adverse shock ￿) and to obtain an
interior solution for N in period 1, we make the following assumption.









Assumption 0 implies that when the household faces an adverse shock, the negative
impact this shock exerts on child marginal contribution ￿￿(w ￿ ￿) makes Y decrease
with the number of children (and therefore on the head￿ s utility) since this contribution
does not cover child cost ￿. On the contrary, children in a household which does not face
an adverse shock provide at the optimum high contributions which cover their cost.
The utility level under the optimal allocation is
H
￿(wp;N) = ￿ ln(C
￿) + ￿ ln(D
￿) + ￿ln(E
￿)
= K(wp) + ln(Y (wp;N));






. Let us now turn to the fertility decision
in period 1, before shocks are realized. The objective is to maximize EH￿ = pH￿(w;N)+











￿￿(w ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿





7This surplus is simply the di⁄erence between total child labor net production and the optimal number
of working children times ￿wp, the marginal productivity of the n￿
l -th working child:
n￿
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We start the comparative statics analysis by studying the ￿rst stage decision. More pre-
cisely, we study ￿rst the impact of the various parameters of the distribution of adult



























A higher p decreases the optimal number of children for two reasons. On the one hand,
the potential decrease in Y due to fertility when an adverse shock occurs is less likely and
on ther other hand, the potential increase in Y due to fertility when an adverse shock
does not occur is is more likely. Note that there exist values of shock probability such that











































This derivative will be negative under the su¢ cient condition that in the presence of
an adverse shock, the income generated by the optimal number of working children,
n￿
lwc ￿ n￿2
l sl, is superior to its quality-adjusted cost n￿
l
￿
￿.10 Because of the convexity of
supervision costs, this very natural condition imposes an upper bound on the number of






2 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
(￿ ￿ ￿￿(w ￿ ￿))
2
Y (w ￿ ￿;N)
2
< 0
9Indeed, fertility is at a corner if the probability of the good state of the world p is smaller than



















10If q > 0, that is, both educated and uneducated children are "goods", then ￿ > 1, making the
condition even weaker than requiring the child labor income to be larger than its actual costs.
8working children. This upper bound, wc￿￿
sl , is larger than n￿
l if and only if the condition
stated in Assumption1 is satis￿ed.
Assumption 1: 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿￿(w ￿ ￿) < ￿wc ￿ ￿.
Assumption 1 entails two components. First, it states that wc > ￿
￿, which is a rather
minor assumption: the marginal productivity of child labor when nl tends to zero (i.e.
the highest marginal productivity level) is likely to be higher that the cost of raising a
child. Second, Assumption 1 relates to Assumption 0 regarding the domain of children￿ s
marginal net contribution in the bad state of the world, ￿￿￿￿(w ￿ ￿). While assumption
0 imposes an upper bound on the latter (i.e. 0), Assumption 1 imposes a lower bound,
namely ￿(￿wc ￿ ￿). This upper bound means that the marginal cost of the last working
child (net of his/her contribution) in the bad state of the world cannot exceed the net
marginal bene￿t of child labor when nl tends to zero.





(￿ ￿ ￿￿(w ￿ ￿))
2
￿














Assumptions 0 and 1 ensure that both the ￿rst and second terms are positive. We sum-
marize the ￿rst part of this comparative statics analysis by summarizing its results in
Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. In the ￿rst stage, the household head￿ s decision on the number of children
is negatively a⁄ected by the probability of facing an adverse shock. Under the su¢ cient but
not necessary condition stated in Assumption 1, this decision is also negatively a⁄ected
by the magnitude of such a potential shock and positively a⁄ected by the head￿ s labor
productivity w.
The second part of this comparative statics exercise is to study what are the impacts
of the ￿rst two stages - fertility decisions and the occurence of shocks - on nl, nd, ne and
d. We start by presenting the impact of fertility decisions in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the third stage, the number of domestic children is positively a⁄ected
by fertility, while the opposite stands for parental supply of domestic labor. The number
of school children is likely to increase with fertility if parental labor income is large and/or
the cost of raising children is low. The impact of fertility on schooling will also be larger
if the utility derived from having an (un)educated child is high (low).
While the e⁄ects of fertility on nl, nd and d are straightforward, we present here the






+ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿):
The e⁄ects of all parameters cited in Proposition 2 are self-explanatory, except the welfare
derived from having children. The welfare attached to an uneducated child, q, has a
positive impact on ￿. Also, if q equals 0, or the utility derived from having an educated
child (Q) tends to in￿nity, ￿ tends to unity, so that @ne
@N = ￿
￿wp￿￿
￿wp . This quantity is, under
9Assumption 0, positive in the good state of the world, and negative if an adverse shock
occurs.
Let us ￿nish our comparative statics analysis by studying the role of adverse shocks.
Firstly, it is straightforward to show that the number of working children is larger if a
shock occurs than otherwise:




A negative shock on adult labor productivity makes child labor more attractive. Larger
shocks, or lower supervision costs, or larger child domestic productivity strengthen this
result. Also note that, unlike the other comparative statics we are going to study below,
the impact of the shock on child labor does not depend on the total number of children.
We now study the e⁄ect of the shock on the number of educated children.










Loosely speaking, the number of school children will be lower in the event of a shock if the




4sl . More precisely, ne will be lower in the event of a shock
if and only if N is larger than the threshold Ne ￿
w2
c￿￿2w(w￿￿)
4sl￿ . Let us now substitute N￿
for N in order to obtain a condition that only depends on parameters. Then, the third




w(￿ ￿ ￿￿(w ￿ ￿)) ￿ p￿￿
















Except for the ￿rst numerator, w(￿ ￿ ￿￿(w ￿ ￿))￿p￿￿, all terms of the right hand side
are positive. The latter is positive if and only if p is smaller than pe ￿
w(￿￿￿￿(w￿￿))
￿￿ 2
]0;1[.11 This is in line with our previous interpretation (i.e. that N should be small
enough) since we know from Proposition 1 that fertility is increasing with p. If this is the
case, the e⁄ect of facing an adverse shock on the number of educated children is negative:
ne(w ￿ ￿) ￿ ne(w) < 0 , p < pe ￿
w(￿ ￿ ￿￿(w ￿ ￿))
￿￿
2 ]0;1[:
It will show clearer to interpret this result after the shock￿ s e⁄ects on all variables have
been studied. Let us thus proceed with nd. Since N is ￿xed at this stage, the e⁄ect of a
shock on the number of domestic children is simply the opposite of the sum of the e⁄ects
on nd and ne.














The number of domestic children is likely to be higher in case of a shock if the total
11To see that pe < 1, note that the former inequality is equivalent to ￿(w￿￿ ￿ ￿)(w ￿ ￿) < 0.





4sl￿ > Ne. Therefore, if N > Nd,
a shock results in a larger nd and a lower ne. If N 2 [Ne;Nd[, a shock still results in a
lower ne, but results in a lower nd as well. Finally, if N < Ne, a shock results in lower nd
and even a larger ne. Note that unlike the comparative statics on nl and ne, the sign of
the shock here depends on a preference parameter: the smaller the descending altruism
parameter ￿, the more likely will there be a decrease in nd if a shock occurs. Parents who
care relatively more about their children￿ s education are more likely to substitute child
labor for domestic labor. The impact of the shock on the adult allocation of time, which
we study now, also depends on a preference parameter, i.e. ￿:














A decrease in adult labor productivity has two types of e⁄ects on the allocation of adult
time. On the one hand, this shock creates a negative income e⁄ect, which may be overcome
by increasing adult paid labor supply. On the other hand, this shock a⁄ects relative
productivities both between agents and between activities. As we have seen above, this
substitution e⁄ect translates into an increase in child labor. Also, adult domestic work
becomes relatively more productive, which may lead to an increase in d. The sign of the
net e⁄ect on d depends mainly on two elements. First, it depends negatively on N. More
precisely, under the su¢ cient but not necessary condition that N < Ne, the total cost of
children has a small impact on C, the negative income e⁄ect is thus dominated and the
household head will decrease her paid labor supply in order to maintain a su¢ cient level
of the consumption good. This condition is however not necessary, and larger values of
N may be compatible with an increase in adult domestic work. This is more likely to be
the case if the preference parameter for domestic good consumption ￿ is high. However,
it can be shown that for N ￿ Nd, the occurence of the shock leads to a decrease in adult
domestics labor.12
We summarize all the e⁄ects of an adverse shock on the stage 3 decision variables in
Proposition 3.
12The e⁄ect of the shock on d for N = Nd equals
(d(w ￿ ￿) ￿ d(w))N=Nd = ￿￿2w(w ￿ ￿)
2sl
(1 ￿ (￿ + ￿))
￿
< 0:
11Proposition 3. If an adverse shock occurs in stage 2, the household head will allocate
more children to paid labor than she would have in the absence of such a shock. This
increase in child paid labor does not depend on the total number of children, unlike the
other variables of interest for which the following structure applies:
￿ If the total number of children is su¢ ciently small (N < Ne), the shock induces the
household head to increase her supply of domestic labor and to decrease the number of
domestic children. This decrease in child domestic labor more than compensates the
increase in child paid labor. Consequently, the number of school children increases.
￿ If the total number of children is intermediate (N 2 [Ne;Nd[), the shock induces the
household head to compensate the increase in child paid labor by decreases in both
school and domestic labor. The variation in adult domestic labor supply depends
positively on preferences towards domestic good consumption.
￿ If the total number of children is large (N ￿ Nd), the shock induces the household
head to decrease her supply of domestic labor and to increase the number of domestic
children. Consequently, both increases in child paid and domestic labor are to be
compensated by a decrease in the number of school children.
3 Data and main variables
Our empirical analysis is based on the data set from the Senegalese Survey on Education
and Household Wellbeing. This survey was carried out in 2003 by the DPS (Department
of Planning and Statistics) of the Republic of Senegal in collaboration with the Ministry of
Education (Senegal), Cornell University (USA), CREA (University of Dakar) and INRA
(France). The survey comprises three series of questionnaires: household-, community-
(village and city) and school-level. The household questionnaire consists of ten di⁄erent
books collecting information about household and individual characteristics, education,
health, dwelling, migration, employment, transfers, expenses and assets. The community
questionnaire collects information on the characteristics (infrastructures, availability of
school facilities, social and economic organization, economy, etc) of the villages and cities
where the surveyed populations live. The school component of the survey contains infor-
mation on school facilities such as the setting characteristics, the number of teacher, the
teachers￿level, etc.
The survey includes 1,811 households containing 19,137 individuals. After exclusion
for age, sex, and other inconsistencies, our estimation sample consists of 1,801 households
comprising 19,017 individuals. Our population study covers all children aged 6-18 years.
The dataset contains information on time use for household chores (cooking, cleaning,
caring younger siblings, old-people or sick persons, fetching water or ￿rewood, etc) and
homework for all children aged 6-18 years. However, it does not include information on
time use for class attendance or for market work. Therefore, we use binary variables
to capture child participation to each occupation. We consider three main occupations:
household chores, market work, and schooling. We consider that a child is involve in
household chores if he/she reports spending more than two hours per day performing
domestic tasks. Note that, for consistency reason, our sample excludes all cases reporting
spending more than seventy hours per week doing household chores. We de￿ne child labor
as any productive activity (paid or non-paid) performed within (in the family farm or the
12family business) or outside the household. Finally, a child is considered at school if he/she
reports attending a class in a formal (public or private) or a community school at least
3 days a week. Classes range from ￿rst year of primary school to the last one of senior
secondary school.
We provide in Table 1 information about the proportions of children involved in all
categories, including combinations of occupations and absence of occupation. In the
sample, most children are specialized in one activity. The ￿rst category of specialization
is ￿ going to school￿ . For this category, we do not notice any gender gap between boys and
girls. However, the sample reveals a clear decrease in school enrollment as children age.
Of the children not attending school in the sample, most fall in the category ￿ domestic
chores only￿ . In this category, a clear gender pattern appears, as children grow old; among
children of age 15 and above, 30 percent of the girls are specialized in doing domestic chores
versus 23 percent for boys. Few proportions of children combine two or three activities.
The main type of activity combination is the association school-market work (around 5
percent of the children). Conversely, a sizeable proportion of children report not being
involved in any activity (around 10 percent of the children within the household). This is
not unexpected since most survey data show that a substantial number of children neither
attend school nor work at home or in the labor market (Cigno & Rosati (2005)). These
children are idle partly because of under-reporting of child labor market and domestic
chores. However, Deb & Rosati (2002) show that these children are clearly di⁄erent from
the other children who go to school, perform domestic chores and/or work.
Table No 1: Proportion of children in di⁄erent activities (average per household, %)
Age categories and gender
Activities 6 - 18 6 - 10 11 - 14 15 - 18
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
School only 37.3 37.9 38.5 39.6 40.0 39.6 34.0 34.5
Domestic chores only 22.0 25.1 21.7 21.6 20.6 23.4 23.5 30.1
Market work only 15.9 13.7 14.8 14.4 14.3 13.2 18.2 13.7
School and domestic chores 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.1 4.4 2.3 2.6
Market work and domestic chores 2.9 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 2.5 4.6
Market work and school 5.2 4.6 5.7 5.9 5.6 4.6 4.5 3.2
All activities 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.0
No occupation 12.9 10.7 11.7 11.2 12.5 10.7 14.2 10.3
The explanatory variables used in the estimation consist in demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of the household and neighborhood variables. The household-
level variables include:
￿ Number of children aged from 0 to 20 years old;
￿ The head of household current age and his ￿ age at the birth of his ￿rst child￿ ; we
introduce these age variables in order to control for cohort e⁄ects in fertility and
for non-completed fertility. We use ￿ head of household age at his ￿rst child￿as
an instrument to estimate the number of children. We assume that this variable
directly a⁄ects the number of children in the household but does not a⁄ect children￿ s
time-use.
13￿ The gender-ratio within the household.
The socio-economic variables include:
￿ Adult literacy rate within the household: we capture it using the proportions of
adult males and females who completed junior secondary school. These variables
allow us to capture the earning capacity of adults living in the households as well
as preferences for education.
￿ Household asset index to measure the possessions of the household. We use this
index as a proxy of ex ante parental income and wealth. Unfortunalety, the survey
did not include questions on expenditures or income. We generate this index using
multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). We use binary indicators on household
level assets (the presence or absence of TV, fridge, radio-tape, fan, and furniture),
and categorical indicators on two variables (types of cooking and lighting energies).
We excluded any productive asset to avoid correlation with children￿ s activities.
￿ Household land possession: this variable captures the surface of land for agricul-
ture owned by the household. We compute this variable using the surface of land
measured in ares (100 squares meters).
￿ Business ownership: a dummy variable indicates whether owns a non-agricultural
business or not.
The last set of variables we use regards the household neighborhood. This comprises:
￿ Distance to source of water,
￿ Number of primary school and the number of secondary school , so as to control for
access to schooling facilities within the neighborhood,
￿ Average level of schooling fees in primary and secondary school, so as to control for
the local education policy,
￿ Shocks: this is the most important element in our analysis, we account for shocks
that each household has ever experienced. These shocks include crop shocks, busi-
ness lost, and unemployment. We split the shocks in two categories. The ￿rst
comprises old shocks viz shocks that have happened at least ￿ve years ago while the
second category includes shocks that occurred one or two years before the survey.
Using these ￿ old shocks￿ , we generate for each household the probability of facing
adverse shocks. Afterward, we use this probability as an instrument to estimate the
number of children that adults in the household have decided to have (just to remind
that this decision takes place in the ￿rst period). The second category of shocks
(recent shocks) will be used to estimate parents￿decision of children￿ s time-use.
Summary statistics for the variables used are presented in Table 2.
14Table No 2: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Children per household and category
School only 2.03 1.97
Domestic chores only 1.22 1.34
market work only 0.79 1.14
School and domestic chores 0.17 0.61
Market work and domestic chore 0.17 0.49
Market work and school 0.26 0.76
All activities 0.06 0.39
No oocupation 0.65 1.06
Children 6 - 18 per household 5.36 2.93
Children 0 - 20 per household 6.41 3.57
Number female adults 2.93 1.69
Number of male adults 2.11 1.54
Household size 13.03 6.04
Female adult literacy (%) 19.71 52.44
Male adult literacy (%) 34.59 68.62
Age of head of household 54.10 12.48
Head of household age at ￿rst child (male) 34.60 8.59
Head of household age at ￿rst child (female) 24.65 6.00
Agricultural land (surface in ares) 531.15 734.52
Number of primary school per district 1.75 0.91
Number of secondary school per district 0.68 0.77
4 Estimation strategy
First, a Poisson model is used to estimate the number of children with information on
the household￿ s ex ante distribution of income and standard instruments. The ex ante
distribution is captured with proxies of parental permanent income and probability of
facing a shock. Permanent income is based on the wealth index and parental education.
The probability of shocks is obtained with the ￿tted values of a probit model that es-
timates the occurence of shocks on the whole set of household, neighborhood and area
characteristics, except family size and related variables. We control for the number of
children using as instruments shocks that have a⁄ected households during the last decade
and the age of the household head at his ￿rst child. While these instruments may have an
impact on children￿ s occupations, credible alternative instruments are unfortunately not
available from the dataset. Preliminary results suggest that the predictions of Proposition
1 are validated by the data (see other ￿les).
Second, a multivariate Tobit model estimates the determinants of children occupa-
tions including the occurence of shocks. Three categories of activities are considered for
children￿ s occupation: school attendance, income-generating work (market work), and
housework. The literature usually assumes these activities as mutually exclusive. The
reality, however, is that children may use their time in di⁄erent combinations of activi-
ties. This paper estimates children￿ s occupation considering also combined activities. To
estimate our model, let I￿
ij be the proportion of children doing activity i in household j;
15i = 1;:::m, m being the number of activities.The reduced form equations representing
activities are assumed to take the form:
I
￿
ij = ￿nj + X
0
j￿ + ￿ij (4)
where : nj = Zj￿ + X
0
j’ + ￿j
where nj captures the number of children of schooling age in household j, X is a vector
of explanatory variables and ￿ij an error term assumed to be distributed with mean 0 and
variance ￿2
ij: Zj corresponds to the instruments controling for the endogeneity of nj and
￿j is the error term of the equation representing the number of children in household j:
The endogeneity of nj is addressed by adapting the two￿ step procedure proposed by
Smith & Blundell (1986). The ￿rst step, where nj is regressed on the set of exogenous
explanatory variables Xj, and the set of instruments Zj has been described above. At the
second stage, the residuals b ￿ from the ￿rst stage are included as an additional regressor
in each equation of activity as follows:
I
￿
ij = ￿nj + ￿b ￿ + X
0
j￿ + ￿ij (5)
Note that our dependent variable corresponds to the proportion of children in a given
activity or combination of activities. Therefore, the system of equations in (1) implies
that for the ith equation, the single dependent variable I￿
ij is observed with non-negative








Equation (6) indicates that the proportion of children doing activity i possesses mixed
discrete-continuous distribution. For each activity, we observe either the discrete outcome
I￿
ij = 0 or the continuous outcome I￿
ij > 0:The discrete outcome occurs when households
choose for their children the specialization in activity k;(k 6= i). Hence, for the equation
Iij non-negligible proportions of its values may be identically zero. Equations (5) and
(6) combined constitute a Tobit or censored model, where the dependent variable Iij
is censored at zero. When there is no correlation between decisions to be allocated to
each occupation, equations (5) and (6) can be speci￿ed and estimated using a single
equation Tobit model. However, when decisions are determined by the same process, a
single equation approach would fail to capture the interactions e⁄ects across equations
representing activities. In that case, equations (5) and (6) should be considered as a
multivariate Tobit model.
The multivariate Tobit model allows accommodating cross-equation restrictions using
joint estimation of the equations. In what follows, we use this approach to investigate
the determinants of children￿ s activities. As far as the authors know, this is the ￿rst
paper using this estimation strategy to study children￿ s occupation. The multivariate
Tobit system has been mainly used to estimate systems of demand equations where some
consumers choose not to buy several the goods or systems of input demand and supply
equations where ￿rms choose not to produce several of the outputs or not to use several
of the inputs.























, ￿j = (￿1j;::::;￿mj)
0
N (0;￿) (￿j is distributed multivariate
normal with mean zero and (m ￿ m) covariance matrix ￿), and ￿j are iid across house-
holds.13
In the system above, there are m equations of activities and a sample data of N obser-
vations (j = 1;::::;N):The parameter estimates in equations (7) and (8) can be obtained
by maximizing the likelihood function of the sample. Since there are m dependent vari-
ables, there would be 2m possible combinations of observations at their censoring points.
Let Cr be a censoring regime with values equal to zero for the censored equations and
one for the non-censored equations, r = 1;2;:::;2m.









j gives the likelihood of the case when the jth observation falls into regime r
(for further details see Barslund (2007)).
Evaluating the likelihood function in (9) may be intractable, especially when the
number of dependent variables, m, is large. In other words, it may be di¢ cult to calculate
the expression (9) since it involves high dimensional integrals. The solution consists
therefore of simulating rather than calculating these integrals using probability simualtion
methods. These methods are based on the fact that the integral of interest represents the
probability of an event in the popualtion.
There are di⁄erent probability simulations methods, but the Maximum Simulated
Likelihood (MSL) appears to outperform all others. The only problem is that it is com-
putationally time consuming. The maximum simulated likelihood is a conceptually simple
extension of the maximum likelihood estimation. However, instead of gathering the log-
likelihood through analytical or numerical methods, the log-likelihood is simulated and
then maximized to obtain maximum simulated estimators of the model parameters.
In our estimations we use this method exploiting the mvtobit STATA procedure de-
veloped by Barslund (2007).
5 Results
As indicated above, we ￿rst estimate the parameters underlying the number of children
using Poisson, afterward we investigate the determinants of children￿ s occupations. We
begin by analyzing the estimates fromthe ￿ number of children￿equation. Next, we describe
the estimates of the determinants of children￿ s occupations.
13If ￿ is allowed varying across households, this means that equations 6 and 7 correspond to the
speci￿cation of a system of heteroskedastic Tobit equations
175.1 Number of children
Table 3 reports the Poisson estimates for the Number of Children 0 - 20 years old. Results
likely support the predictions of Proposition 1. Except for crops, the higher the exposure
to shocks, fewer is the number of children in the household. However, contrary to a priori
expectations, the exposure to crops shock is not statistically signi￿cant. The negative
sign of the business and unemployment probability shocks suggests that non-agricultural
households account for the potential shocks they face when deciding of the number of
children to have. In contrast, shocks are less likely source of concern in agricultural
households￿decisions of the number of children to have.
Results also indicate progressive e⁄ect of wealth on the number of children; richer
households seem to have more children. The estimates for the wealth quintiles are 11%,
12%, 13%, 14% for the second to the ￿fth quintile, respectively. Conversely, large land-
holdings increase the number of children in the household.
We also ￿nd that households with more educated women have fewer children. However,
the coe¢ cient on the number of the literated adult male is not statistically signi￿cant.
Table No 3: Poisson estimates for Number of Children (0 - 20)
Explanatory variables Coe¢ cients Std. Error
Male literacy -0.049 (0.034)
Female literacy -0.212*** (0.059)
Wealth index, 2nd quintile 0.108** (0.042)
Wealth index, 3rd quintile 0.121*** (0.039)
Wealth index, 4th quintile 0.128*** (0.034)
Wealth index, 5th quintile 0.141*** (0.033)
Business shock probability -0.773** (0.325)
Unemployment probability -0.594** (0.278)
Crops￿ shocks probability 0.029 (0.115)
Agricultural land surface 0.011*** (0.002)
Land surface x Crops￿shocks 0.006 (0.009)
Head of household age at ￿rst child -0.009*** (0.001)




* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In addition, where the head of household starts tardy his childbearing, the number of
children is less important.
5.2 Children Occupations
Tables 4 and 5 present the results from the multivariate Tobit regressions. The model
speci￿cation allows for the existence of covariance e⁄ects acrosss equations representing
di⁄erents occupations. We investigate the existence of these interactions e⁄ects using a
Wald test of the restrictions that (￿21 = ￿31 = ￿41 = ￿32 = ￿42 = ￿43 = 0): Results in both
18tables show that the Wald test of the restrictions that all ￿jk = 0 yields a test statistic
of 438.913 and 461.326 (respectively) which is asymptotically distributed as chi-square
with six degrees of freedom (p = 0:000). This indicates strong evidence of signi￿cant con-
temporaneous cross-e⁄ect between the di⁄erents time-use options for children within a
household. Therefore, we conclude that the system-wide estimator provides an e¢ ciency
gain over univariate speci￿cations of the tobit models. We calculate the standard errors
using a robust covariance estimation procedure. Note that our estimation approach is
computationally very demanding. Therefore, for sake of e¢ ciency, we restrict our estima-
tions to single activities (chores, work, school, or idle), using combinations of activities as
a reference.
Table 4 reports estimates of the augmented multivariate Tobit model for children￿ s
time-use following the approach of Smith & Blundell (1986). Results clearly show the
positive e⁄ect on children specialization that arises from the presence of large number
of children within a household. Household with more children have larger proportion
of children going exclusively to school and more children performing domestic chores or
working for pay. These results are coherent with Gomes￿￿ndings and the predictions of
our theoretical model.
In contrast, ￿ndings are seemingly not supporting our theoretical predictions regard-
ing the e⁄ects of adverse shocks on children￿ s occupations. Except for schooling, the
coe¢ cients of shocks-related variables are not statistically signi￿cant in any of the occu-
pation equation. However, shocks￿impact on schooling activity appears consistent with
the model￿ s prediction. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term (shock x Number of chil-
dren) in the equation for schooling is statistically signi￿cant and negative. Household
with large number of children are likely to reduce the number of children attending school
to cope with adverse shocks.
The other results are consistent with most of the results from the literature. Household
with more educated adults male have more children attending school and fewer working
children. It is however noteworthy that the coe¢ cient on the female adult literacy is not
signi￿cant in the schooling equation. Other studies support the contrary. The existence
of school facilities in household￿ s neighborhood displays signi￿cant and negative impact
on paid work activities for children. In contrast, it favors school attendance.
In the augmented multivariate Tobit model, we account for the endogeneity of the
number of children 0-20 years oldusing Smith-Blundell procedure that is analogous to the
Rivers & Vuong (1988) method for binary model. We estimate the number of children
using as intruments shocks that have a⁄ected households during the last decade and the
age of the household head at his ￿rst child.
To test for the potential endogeneity of the number of children, the multivariate Tobit
model is also estimated by excluding the augmented residuals in all equations. This is
done in order to investigate the extent of bias introduced in the estimates when potentially
endogenous variables are included in the regressions. Results are given in Table 5. It
shows indicate that there are no signi￿cant changes in any of the estimated coe¢ cients.
Thus, we can conclude that accounting for the endogeneity of the number of children is
trivial.
19Table No 4: Augmented multivariate Tobit estimates of number of children per category of occupation
Chores Work School No activity
Explanatory variables Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err.
Number of children 0 - 20 years old .20*** .03 .13*** .03 .35*** .02 .17*** .03
Fitted residuals -.00*** .00 .01* .01 -.00 .00 -.00 .00
Shocks -.03 .22 -.12 .28 .63** .25 -.48 .29
Number of children ￿ Shocks -.04 .03 .01 .03 -.09*** .03 .03 .04
Fitted residual x Shocks -.00 00 -.01 .01 .00 .00 -.00 .00
Male literacy .17 .13 -1.04*** .20 .49*** .14 .45** .18
Female literacy .31 .21 -.72** .30 .17 .21 .51* .29
Wealth index .23*** .08 -.02 .09 .12 .09 .14 .10
Agricultural land surface -.03** .01 .01 .01 -.01 .01 -.01 .01
Head of household, male .10 .12 .25* .15 -.01 .14 -.17 .18
Average age of children aged 0 - 20 .02 .02 .05* .03 -.21*** .02 -.00 .03
Girls ratio among 0 - 20 .71*** .14 -.75*** .16 .03 .16 -.77*** .20
Proportion of female among adults .26 .23 -.05 .26 -.19 .26 -.11 .34
Multilevel schools -.13 .09 .02 .11 .26** .11 -.05 .12
Number of primary school per district .03 .05 -.20*** .07 -.01 .05 -.02 .07
Secondary schools per district -.04 .07 -.24*** .08 .16** .07 .11 .08
Constant -1.41*** .46 -.59 .51 1.72*** .47 -1.22** .60
Number of observations 1378
Log_pseudolikelihood -7233.79
Wald Chi2(64) 7452.15
Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0: chi2(6) = 438.913 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table No 5: Multivariate Tobit estimates of number of children per category of occupation
Chores Work School No activity
Explanatory variables Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err. Coe⁄. Std. Err.
Number of children 0 - 20 years old .20*** .02 .12*** .02 .35*** .02 .17*** .03
Shocks -.06 .21 .09 .23 .57** .00 -.46 .28
Number of children ￿ Shocks -.04 .03 .02 .03 -.09*** .04 .03 .04
Male literacy .18 .13 -1.03*** .18 .48*** .13 .48*** .19
Female literacy .30 .21 -.64** .29 .22 .22 .44 .29
Wealth index .23*** .08 -.02 09 .13 .09 .17 .11
Agricultural land surface -.01 .01 -.01 .01 -.01 .01 .01 .01
Head of household, male .10 .12 .22 .14 -.08 .14 -.15 .17
Average age of children aged 0 - 20 .03 .02 .05** .02 -.22*** .02 -.01 .03
Girls ratio among 0 - 20 .73*** .14 -.77*** .16 -.06 .15 -.69*** .19
Proportion of female among adults .12 .24 .04 .24 -.07 .24 -.10 .32
Multilevel schools -.11 .09 .03 .10 .27** .10 -.08 .12
Number of primary school per district .02 .05 -.19*** .06 -.01 .05 -.05 .07
Secondary schools per district -.04 .06 -.25*** .07 .19** .07 .11 .08
Constant -1.40*** .45 -.95* .48 1.84*** .47 -1.16* .59
Number of observations 1462
Log_pseudolikelihood -7656.31
Chi2(56) 1734.09
Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0: chi2(6) = 461.326 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
206 Conclusion
This paper formulates and estimates a model of household fertility and child occupation.
Fertility decisions are made ￿rst, in a risky environment, while the allocation of children￿ s
occupations - namely school, paid work and domestic chores - and of parental time takes
place in a second period, when shocks are realized and fertility cannot be adjusted. In
line with our data, children are specialized in a single occupation, which leads to child
discrimination. Fertility is higher in households with more favorable ex-ante distribution
of parental income. The number of domestic children is positively a⁄ected by fertility,
while the opposite stands for parental supply of domestic labor. The number of school
children is likely to increase with fertility if parental labor income is large and/or the
cost of raising children is low. The impact of fertility on schooling will also be larger if
preferences for education are strong. Adverse shocks lead to an increase in the number of
working children. Large families tend to adjust to shocks by increasing domestic labor and
decreasing schooling, while the opposite stands for small families, in which case parents
increase their supply of domestic labor. We test the model￿ s predictions in two steps using
data from the 2003 survey Senegalese Survey on Education and Household Wellbeing. A
Poisson model estimates the number of children with information on the household￿ s
ex ante distribution of income and standard instruments. A multivariate Tobit model
estimates the determinants of children occupations including the occurence of shocks and
accounting for the endogeneity of fertility.
The Poisson estimates indicate that the data likely support our predictions with re-
spect to the e⁄ect on fertility of the probability of facing shocks. Except for crops shock,
the higher the exposure to shocks, fewer is the number of children in the household. The
negative sign of the business and unemployment probability shocks suggests that non-
agricultural households account for the potential shocks they face when deciding of the
number of children to have. In contrast, shocks are less likely source of concern in agri-
cultural households￿decisions of the number of children to have. Our results also show
a progressive e⁄ect of wealth on the number of children; richer households seem to have
more children.
Conversely, estimates from the augmented multivariate Tobit model clearly show that
children￿ s specialization probability is positively related to the number of children within
a household. Household with more children have larger proportion of children going exclu-
sively to school and more children performing domestic chores or working for pay. These
results are coherent with Gomes￿￿ndings and the structure of our theoretical model. Our
theoretical predictions regarding the e⁄ects of adverse shocks on children￿ s occupations
are partially supported. The coe¢ cients of shocks-related variables are statistically sig-
ni￿cant in the schooling equation. Household with large number of children are likely to
reduce the number of children attending school to cope with adverse shocks.
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